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HAROLD A. HINTZE (A-1499)
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60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-7900
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Craig G. Adamson
Eric P. Lee
Cameron S. Denning
310 South Main Street, Suite 13 3 0
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants/
Cross-Appellees

Appellees, FARRELL G. FORSBERG AND VICKI A. FORSBERG, by and
through their undersigned attorney, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
Rule 3 5 petition the Court for a REHEARING of that portion of this
Court's decision dated March 13, 1995 pertaining to damages (See
Exhibit "A11 hereto) .

This PETITION is based upon the following

facts which counsel believes have been overlooked or misapprehended
by this Court.
1.

This Court's OPINION states:

The trial court found:
27. The property, as represented by the
Defendants, would contain 9,996 sq. ft.
The actual size of the property is
approximately 4,628 sq. ft.
The fair
market
value
of
the
property,
as
indicated
by the Defendants[']
own
testimony, is the sum of $3.85 per sq.
ft. and the Plaintiff thereby incurred
damages as a direct and proximate result
of
the
Defendants'
negligent
misrepresentation
in
the
sum
of
$21,767.90.
The trial court seems to have accepted the position
of the buyers' counsel that buyers thought they
were receiving a backyard
that was 98' x 102'.
However, there is simply no evidence to support
this position. Neither party testified that they
believed the backyard
was 98 feet deep.
Indeed,
such a distance would have placed the rear boundary
of the yard in the parking lot accompanying the
GMAC building adjacent to buyers' home. (DECISION
dated March 13, 1995, p. 7)
2.

This Court is incorrect in both observations made in

support of its vacating the monetary judgment entered by the Trial
1

Court.

There JLS evidence the buyers thought the backyard

opposed to building lot) was 98' x 102' and, such a backyard

(as
would

NOT "...extend into the middle of the GMC parking lot."
3.

This Court seems to have accepted, as if it were true,

the statement made by the Sellers at Trial on examination by their
own attorney:
Question: [By KIMBALLS' counsel] Did you ever
discuss with mr. Forsberg the fact
that the jbacJcyard extended 98 feet
or 102 feet beyond where you were
standing when you were looking at
it?
Answer:

[By VICTOR M. KIMBALL] I did not.

Question: Approximately how close to the
General Motors Building would that
98 or 102 feet have been?
Answer:

Well, I think it would have been in
the parking lot of General Motors.

Question: And approximately how far beyond the
trees would that have gone?
Answer:

4.

Probably the whole lot size again
further.
(R. 1164, L. 9-22.;
APPELLANTS' BRIEF p. 15)

The truth is Mr. KIMBALL doesn't know where the boundary

line is, was, or would be, if extended. The above statement, under
oath to the Court, is itself a "negligent misrepresentation" - one
that should not be accepted by this Court and used to mitigate the
damages of the negligent misrepresentations made by the same
declarant to the buyers.
2

25.

This Court did not obtain from the Clerk's office the

Exhibits used in this case.

It is respectfully requested that the

Court do so in considering the merits of this PETITION because the
charts, plats, photos and graphs (specifically Plaintiffs' Exhibit
Nos. 1, 4, and 35) show conclusively and irrebuttably the gross
exaggeration

of Mr. KIMBALL'S

repeated on appeal.

statement

uttered

at Trial

and

KIMBALL would have this Court believe, as he

urged upon the Trial Court, that the FACT SHEET misrepresentation
of a backyard

98' x 102' was "unbelievable" because of the enormous

size of such a lot —

one which would consume a portion of the GMAC

parking

the

lot.

prepared

From

the attached

Exhibits

Exhibit

above

described

Counsel

"B" to this PETITION

using

has
the

footages described in the courtroom Exhibits, testimony and County
Plats, all of which conclusively show why the Trial Court did not
accept Mr. KIMBALL'S testimony and why he believed Dr. and Mrs.
FORSBERG could have assumed that the poplar trees were in fact
planted within a 98' x 102'
6.

backyard.

KIMBALLS also represented to this Court in their oral

argument that their BRIEF contained "a complete recitation of the
testimony and documentary evidence regarding the size of the lot
[sic]"

(APPELLANTS' BRIEF p. 15.)
7.

The

above

representation

misrepresentation by KIMBALL.

to

the

Court

was

another

For the Court to assume that there
3

is no additional testimony other than set forth in the APPELLANTS7
BRIEF is error.

KIMBALL deliberately failed to "marshall" the

following Rebuttal testimony concerning the GMAC parking lot:
Q

[By Mr. Hintze] Do you recall
directing your attention to P-27, did you
read the entry there entitled yard size?

A

[By Mr. FORSBERG] Yes, we did.

Q

Mr. Forsberg, let me ask you first: Was
a consideration of the yard size in any
way significant in your determination of
which house to buy, of the many houses
you were looking at?

A

It was a very critical feature.
We
wanted a home that we could live in
comfortably inside, but it was very
important for us to have a yard that
children, little children could enjoy.
Vicki had grown up with a backyard
that
was very useable, and the children in her
family and the neighborhood children had
spent many hours playing volleyball,
badminton, basketball, many games.
I grew up on a farm where we had
much space, and it was a very critical
feature to us to have a backyard
that
would be satisfactory for children to
really enjoy.

Q

Now, I want to draw your — I want you to
try and go back in your memory, Dr.
Forsberg, because I realize that since
this lawsuit has been, filed you have
prepared numerous exhibits with a tape
measure in this yard, and today you
probably have a little better perception
of distances and feet than you had in
1987. All right.

A

That would be correct.
4

Q

I want you to try and put yourself back
to 1987. Wh.en you read 98 by 102, and
then a feet sign, and then
"flat
backyard."
what did that convey to you?

A

That number at least suggested that that
would be a spacious yard.

Q

Have you — or at that time in your life,
Dr. Forsberg, do you think you could
stand on a porch and pretty well eyeball
where 98 feet would be, or 100 feet would
be?

A

Not very accurately, no.

Q

Do you think you could do that today a
little better?

A

Probably still not very accurately.
could probably ballpark it.

Q

Did you go out in the JbacJcyard and
observe anything about this particular
yard.

A

Yes. I remember on that very first visit
we were in the backyard . we were very
excited to see a very attractively
designed home that had a nice view, which
was also a critical feature.
We were
interested in a yard over a view, but we
found this home to be very attractive.
That does have very attractive view of
the valley, and we were excited to see
this nice, spacious, flat
backyard.
and
we thought such a combination was
difficult to find, .so we were very
excited.
•

Q

*

I

*

Now, did you, when you read the words,
"room for a pool," what did that impress
upon you, if anything?

5

A

That impressed upon me an option and
impressed upon us that it was a
spacious
backyard
where a pool could be installed
if we wished. A pool was not our first
consideration in having a home.
It's
something that we considered as an
option.
But as an investor I was
interested in that as a potential resale
item.
Should we ever have to move and
sell that property, a prospective buyer
would be interested in the option of a
pool, even if we had not installed one.

Q

And as you stood there, Dr. Forsberg,
could you ascertain in your mind whether
or not the JbacJcyard was in fact 98 by 102
as it was flat or the flat portion of it,
I'm saying.

A

I don't
recall
trying
to
make
a
measurement.
The lots on either side
were unfinished lots.
there were just
bare lots that had not been build upon,
and there was a lot of open space there.
So it was a very spacious area.
•

*

*

Q

And would you tell me what mr. Kimball
said and what you said, as best you can,
about the size of the lot? Just direct
your attention to that subject.

A

The exact wording at this time I can't
recall, but I do remember a very critical
issue was the size of the backyard.
Had
the home been an absolutely wonderful
home but had no backyard^,
we would have
had no interest in that home.
And I was very interested in making
sure that the backyard
as it appeared was
actually as spacious as it seemed to be.

6

* * *

Q

And beyond the poplar trees what
located in terms of dirt, if any?

A

Beyond, to the west of the poplar trees
there was dirt, which I assumed had come
from excavation of the foundation, which
had been pushed back and was pushed back
considerably beyond, the poplar trees.

Q

Let's see if you can do any better on
this than Kimball did. I don't know that
you can, but the question was asked of
him" How far is there from the poplar
trees down to where the GMAC property has
ended there? Do you follow me?

A

Yes.

Q

There is a space of undeveloped ground,
is there not?

A

Yes, there is.

Q

Okay. Can you just give us an estimate
of how far down there is from where the
dirt steps down to where the GMAC
property has ended its development?

A

I remember asking — you're asking where
the dirt ended, or where the poplar
trees?

Q

Let's start with the poplar trees, then.

A

The dirt extended probably — oh, maybe
twenty feet beyond to the west of the
poplar trees, but it was grading down.

Q

It was? Okay.

7

is

This

A

It was not flat at that point, it was
grading down. And from the end of the
dirt that was pushed out to the cement
retainer wall which borders on the east,
the General Motors property, I just
roughly guessed that would be maybe
another sixty feet.

Q

Sixty?

A

Fifty, sixty, eighty feet.

Q

And in that area there would be no
development by GMAC that you could
observe?

A

None that I could see. (R. 1709, 1710,
1712, 1713, 1714, 1718, 1719, and 1720)
Court

must

presume

the

Trial

Court

had

properly

determined the damages based upon the evidence and cannot overturn
that determination unless it is "clearly erroneous."
Gillmor, 745 P. 2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987).

Gillmor v.

For this Court to

remand based upon the Appellants representation that all of the
evidence had been "marshalled", and further premise its remand upon
a

gross

"misrepresentation"

misrepresented

backyard

that

would

the

invade

size

of

the

originally

the GMAC parking

lot -

thereby attesting to the "unreasonableness" of the damages assessed
- would permit a tort feasor to mitigate his damages by compounding
his misrepresentations.

8

SUMMARY
For the reasons stated herein the Appellees respectfully
request a REHEARING of that portion of the Court's OPINION which
requires a future proceeding before the Trial Court on the issue of
damages.
Appellants certifies that this PETITION is presented in good
faith and is not interposed for the purpose of delay.
DATED this

Z.& day of March, 1995.

HAROLD A. HINTZ'E

<<<AyC>~'

^T

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
PETITION

FOR

REHEARING,

postage

prepaid,

first-class

to

following:
Craig G. Adamson
Eric P. Lee
Cameron S. Denning
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys of Appellants
310 South Main Street, Suite 13 3 0
Salt lake City, UT 84101
DATED this

2/}

day of March, 1995.

HAROLD A. HINTZE" <3 '—
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
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EXfflBIT "A"

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
Farrell G. and Vicki A. Forsberg
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
Case No. 930418-CA
v.
ttnrrnnaham & Kimball, a Utah
general partnership? Christensen
& Kimball, a Utah general
partnership as partner of
Buminaham & Kimball? Victor M.
Kimball, individually and as
general partner of Christensen
& Kimball. Spectrum Development
Corporation, a Utah corporation,
as partner of Burningham & Kimball,
Defendants and Appellants.

11,

March JJL, 1995.

OPINION (For Publication).

Opinion of the Court by JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge;
GREGORY K. ORME, and MICHAEL J. WILKINS, Judges, concur.

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I hereby certify that on the \5
day of March, 1995, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was deposited in the
United States mail to the parties listed below:
Craig G. Adamson
Eric P. Lee
Cameron S. Denning
Dart, Adamson & Donovan
Attorneys at Law for Appellants
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Harold A. Hintze
Attorney at Law for Appellees
60 East South Temple, 17th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was deposited
in the United States mail to the district court judge listed below:
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy
District Court Judge
240 East 400 South, Room 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

QkUxx^n^s?
Hdllie Haye
Judicial Secret
et^jry

TRIAL COURT:

Third District, Salt Lake County #900906667

FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

MAR 1 31995

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
Farrell G. and Vicki A.
Forsberg,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
Case No. 930418-CA
v.
Burningham & Kimball, a Utah
general partnership:
Christensen & Kimball, a Utah
general partnership as partner
of Burningham & Kimball;
Victor M. Kimball,
individually and as general
partner of Christensen &
Kimball. Spectrum Development
Corporation, a Utah
corporation, as partner of
Burningham & Kimball,

F I L E D
(March 1 3 , 1995)

Defendants and Appellants.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy
Attorneys:

Craig G. Adamson, Eric P. Lee, and Cameron S.
Denning, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Harold A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Burningham & Kimball (sellers) appeal the trial court7s
finding that they misrepresented the size of the lot in
connection with a home purchased by Farrell G. and Vicki A.
Forsberg (buyers).1 Sellers also claim the trial court's award

1. In their cross-appeal, buyers complained about many defects
in the construction of the home, urging this court to adopt an
(continued...)

of damages is not supported by the evidence.
and reverse and remand in part.

We affirm in part

FACTS
Sellers purchased approximately twenty building lots in the
Benchmark subdivision. To facilitate the lots/ resale, sellers
built homes on some of the lots, including the home at issue in
this appeal. Buyers' home is situated in the foothills, facing
east with the backyard sloping downward to the west. The back of
the property overlooks a large office building located on
Foothill Drive known as the MGMACM building.
During the construction of the home, fill dirt was removed
from the excavation and placed at the rear of the property,
covering the survey stakes marking the back corners of the lot.
After the stakes were covered, sellers had a row of poplar trees
planted to create a sight barrier between the home and the GMAC
building. The trees were planted by a landscaper hired by
sellers and without regard to the actual boundary of the
property.
Buyers saw a sign advertising the home for sale and
contacted their licensed real estate agent, who took them to the
home, where they inspected the premises. During the visit,
buyers obtained a "fact sheet" which had been left in the home.
The sheet was prepared by a real estate agent whom sellers had
engaged to list the home for sale. When the realtor's listing
contract expired, sellers blocked out the realtor's name, placed
their own names on the sheet, removed a statement at the bottom
of the sheet providing that the information was "[r]eliable but
not guaranteed," and continued to make the fact sheet available
to prospective buyers.
There were no stakes in the backyard or other markers to
indicate to buyers the rear boundaries of the lot. The fact
sheet indicated that the "yard size" was 98' x 102', with a "flat
back yard with room for a pool." The true dimensions of the lot
are 98.23 feet along the north side, 122.40 feet on the east
side, 102.38 feet on the south side, and 77.85 feet along the
west side. The dimension 98' x 102' represents an average of all
four sides.

1. (...continued)
implied warranty of habitability as to the sale of new homes.
However, prior to oral argument this claim was dismissed pursuant
to stipulation. We therefore do not reach this issue.

930418-CA
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Buyers thereafter returned to the home and inspected it with
seller, Victor M. Kimball (Kimball). On this inspection, the
parties had a conversation regarding the size of the back yard.
Buyers indicated that they were interested in a "spacious"
backyard and inquired what the exact boundaries of the yard were.
Kimball responded that he was unsure of the boundaries, but
assured buyers that the row of poplar trees planted at the west
end of the yard was "within the property line."
Buyers purchased the home on or about November 17, 1987.
Several months later, they had the backyard surveyed and learned
that the row of poplar trees was not within the property line,
but was three to fifteen feet beyond the property line.1
At trial, the judge found the combination of the fact sheet,
the planting of the poplar trees, and Kimball's suggestion that
the trees were "within" the boundary constituted a negligent
misrepresentation of the lot size and assessed damages in the
amount of $21,767.90. Sellers appeal.
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The tort of negligent misrepresentation allows
a party injured by reasonable reliance upon a
second party's careless or negligent
misrepresentation of a material fact [to]
recover damages resulting from that injury
when the second party had a pecuniary
interest in the transaction, was in a
superior position to know the material facts,
and should have reasonably foreseen that the
injured party was likely to rely upon the
fact.
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d
55, 59 (Utah 1986); accord Jardine v. Brunswick Corp.. 18 Utah 2d

2. The rear boundary of the lot angles off, therefore the trees
were three feet beyond the boundary line in some areas and
fifteen feet in other areas.

930418-CA
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378, 423 P.2d 659, 661-62 (1967); see also Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 552(1) (1976).3
Sellers claim the trial court erred in finding that they
negligently misrepresented the size of the lot. A trial court's
,f
[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a).
Although the trial court's findings based on the fact sheet
are somewhat problematic, the record supports that when buyers
inquired about the precise boundaries of the backyard, Kimball
responded that he did not know where the exact corners of the lot
were, but indicated that the row of poplar trees was within the
rear boundary of the lot.4 This evidence, by itself, fully
3.

This section states in relevant part:
(1) One who, in the course of his
business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 552(1) (1976).
4.

In relevant part, Forsberg testified, with our emphasis:
Q: Did you have some discussion with Mr.
Kimball about those poplar trees?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Tell us what you said and what he
[Kimball] said, as best you can?
A: Well, I was trying to confirm the
boundaries of the backyard, and I asked him
about the poplar trees. And he related to me
that the poplar trees were a reflection of
the backyard, roughly the back west boundary
of the yard.
. . . .

A: He described that the poplar treesbecause there was no landscape markers there,
I was concerned as to exactly where the back
(continued...)

930418-CA
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supports the trial court's findings. Further, sellers had a
pecuniary interest in the transaction and were presumably in a
superior position than buyers to know the material facts
regarding the lot. See Price-Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 59.
Thus, on the record before us, we cannot say the trial
court's findings that sellers misrepresented the actual size of
the lot were clearly erroneous.
REASONABLE RELIANCE
Additionally, sellers argue the trial court erred when it
determined that buyers reasonably relied upon their
representation regarding the size of the lot.5
With respect to whether reliance is reasonable, the supreme
court has stated that one who complains of being injured by a
false representation
cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is
told him, but has the duty of exercising such
degree of care to protect his own interests
as would be exercised by an ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person under the
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is
precluded from holding someone else to
account for the consequences of his own
neglect.
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662-63
(1967) . Sellers assert that if buyers were genuinely concerned
with the actual size of the lot, they should have obtained an
4.

(...continued)
corners and back property line were, and he
assured me that the poplar trees were within
the property of the residence for sale.
Both on direct and cross examination, Kimball testified that
he did not know the exact dimensions of the lot and denied the
statement that he represented that the row of poplar trees
reflected the rear boundary of the lot. Although this testimony
is in conflict, we defer to the fact finder. See Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a).
5. Specifically, the court found: "The Forsbergs reasonably
relied upon the representations of the Defendants relative to the
size of the property. There was no notice whatsoever at the
closing as to the size of the property . . . . • •

930418-CA
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independent survey of the property. Buyers contend that in the
absence of facts putting them on notice of an alleged
misrepresentation, they had no duty to investigate. They cite
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), in support of this
proposition.
In Duaan, the buyers claimed a real estate agent
misrepresented the acreage conveyed in a land sales contract.
The court explained:
11

* [A] vendor may be liable in tort for
misrepresentations as to the area of land
conveyed, notwithstanding such
misrepresentations were made without actual
knowledge of their falsity.' The reason, of
course, is that the parties to a real estate
transaction do not deal on equal terms. An
owner is presumed to know the boundaries of
his own land . . . .
If he does not know the
correct information, he must find out or
refrain from making representations to
unsuspecting strangers. *Even honesty in
making a mistake is no defense as it is
incumbent upon the vendor to know the
facts."1
Id. at 1246 (quoting Sorenson v. Adams, 571 P.2d 769, 775-76
(Idaho 1977) (citations omitted)). Further, the court stated,
"[A] vendee of real property, in the absence of facts putting him
on notice, has no duty to investigate to determine whether the
vendor has misrepresented the area conveyed." Id. at 1247
(emphasis added).
Here, sellers made a specific representation about the size
of the yard in the fact sheet. Moreover, they planted a row of
trees at the rear of the lot to create a barrier between the home
and the neighboring GMAC building without regard to the rear
boundary of the lot. Finally, sellers represented that those
trees were within the rear boundary. Notwithstanding the fact
that Kimball stated that he did not know the "exact corners" of
the lot, the trial court found that buyers were not put on notice
that the lot was smaller than represented by sellers. The trial
court thus implicitly found that buyers had no duty to
investigate further the true boundaries of the lot before
completing the purchase of the home. Based upon the foregoing,
we cannot say the trial court's finding that buyers' reliance was
reasonable is clearly erroneous.

930418-CA
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DAMAGES
Finally, sellers maintain that the trial court miscalculated
the damages, and therefore erred when it assessed damages in the
amount of $21,767.90.
The proper measure of damages in an action for negligent
misrepresentation is that "necessary to compensate the plaintiff
for the pecuniary loss to him which the misrepresentation is the
legal cause." Restatement (Second) of Torts S 552B(1) (1976).
Such damages may include "the difference between the value of
what [plaintiff] has received in the transaction and its purchase
price or other value given," id. § 552B(l)(a), and any "pecuniary
loss suffered . . . as a consequence of the plaintiff's reliance
upon the misrepresentation," id. § 552B(1)(b). This court will
presume a trial court's award of damages to be correct and will
overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous with no reasonable
support in the evidence. Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461, 462
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
The trial court found:
27. The property, as represented by the
Defendants, would contain 9,996 sg. ft. The
actual size of the property is approximately
4,628 sq. ft. The fair market value of the
property, as indicated by the Defendants[']
own testimony, is the sum of $3.85 per sq.
ft. and the Plaintiffs thereby incurred
damages as a direct and proximate result of
the Defendants' negligent misrepresentation
in the sum of $21,767.90.
The trial court seems to have accepted the position of
buyers' counsel that buyers thought they were receiving a
backyard that was 98' x 102'. However, there is simply no
evidence to support this position. Neither party testified that
they believed the backyard was 98 feet deep. Indeed, such a
distance would have placed the rear boundary of the yard in the
parking lot accompanying the GMAC building adjacent to buyers'
home.
The trial court's calculation of damages is not supported by
the record. Buyers did not discuss with sellers whether the
backyard extended 98 feet from the foundation of the house.
Rather, buyers believed the rear boundary of the lot was within
"a couple of feet" of the row of poplar trees. On crossexamination, Forsberg testified that the furthest distance
between the home and the row of trees was 45 feet—a distance
which he testified he would consider spacious.
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The proper calculation of damages is the difference in the
value of the property buyers thought they were receiving and the
value of the property they actually received. See Restatement,
suora, § 552B(1). We therefore vacate the award of damages and
remand for the trial court to determine the difference in value
between the property buyers thought they were receiving,
calculated with reference to a boundary "a couple of feet" beyond
the row of poplar trees and extended in a reasonable manner from
the marker, and the amount they actually received.
CONCLUSION
We r.ffim tho ':iJ.al court's finding that sellers negligently
misrepresented the size of the lot purchased by buyers.
Moreover, we hold that the trial court's finding that buyers
reasonably relied on that misrepresentation was not clearly
erroneous. Finally, we reverse the damages awarded and remand to
determine the difference in value between the property buyers
thought they were receiving and the property they actually
received.

''Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

' *k

Gregory K^tJrme, Judge

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
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